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In Brief
To represent plans efficiently, states of
the world can be clustered hierarchically
into ‘‘contexts’’. Balaguer et al. show that
as humans navigate a virtual subway
environment, fMRI signals encode the
complexity of a hierarchical plan.
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Planning allows actions to be structured in pursuit of
a future goal. However, in natural environments,
planning over multiple possible future states incurs
prohibitive computational costs. To represent plans
efficiently, states can be clustered hierarchically
into ‘‘contexts’’. For example, representing a journey
through a subway network as a succession of indi-
vidual states (stations) is more costly than encoding
a sequence of contexts (lines) and context switches
(line changes). Here, using functional brain imaging,
we asked humans to perform a planning task in a vir-
tual subway network. Behavioral analyses revealed
that humans executed a hierarchically organized
plan. Brain activity in the dorsomedial prefrontal cor-
tex and premotor cortex scaled with the cost of hier-
archical plan representation and unique neural sig-
nals in these regions signaled contexts and context
switches. These results suggest that humans repre-
sent hierarchical plans using a network of caudal pre-
frontal structures.
INTRODUCTION
By forming and executing plans, humans can engage in complex
behaviors such as preparing a cup of coffee or organizing a trip
to London. When asked to perform multistep tasks such as
these, patients with lesions to the prefrontal cortex (PFC) often
exhibit disordered action sequences that fail to achieve the
specified goal (Owen et al., 1990; Shallice, 1982; Shallice and
Burgess, 1991), and hippocampal patients have difficulty imag-
ining the future states entailed (Schacter et al., 2012). Moreover,
functional neuroimaging has confirmed the involvement of hu-
man prefrontal and limbic structures in forming and executing
plans, particularly in spatial environments (Howard et al., 2014;
Schacter and Addis, 2007; Unterrainer and Owen, 2006). Never-
theless, linking these macroscopic neural findings to the under-
lying computational mechanisms that subserve planning re-
mains an open challenge for psychologists and neuroscientists.
Planning is often described as mental exploration of a network
of interlinked, internally represented episodes (or ‘‘states’’). Ac-Neuron 90, 893–903
This is an open access article undcording to one conception, future states belong to a decision
‘‘tree’’ in which each node is a decision point and each branch
a possible response. Plans are representations of trajectories
through the tree, selected on the basis of their long-term cumu-
lative outcome (Daw et al., 2005, 2011; Huys et al., 2012; Russell
and Norvig, 1995). Computer-based algorithms have success-
fully exploited this strategy to achieve expert levels of perfor-
mance in board games such as chess and weiqi (Go) (Silver
et al., 2016). However, because the number of possible action
sequences grows exponentially with each additional step in
the planning horizon, this approach is computationally intrac-
table in many natural environments (Gershman et al., 2015).
For example, a visitor would probably not plan a trip to London
by envisaging every unique interim step en route to the destina-
tion, but might rather imagine attaining only a subset of key
states, such as reaching an airport or other transport hub.
In machine learning and computational neuroscience, it is
widely recognized that the computational demand associated
with planning can be reduced by exploiting hierarchical structure
in the environment, with states clustered into larger ‘‘contexts’’
(Badre et al., 2010; Botvinick et al., 2009; Koechlin and Jubault,
2006; Sutton and Barto, 1998). To understand how a hierarchical
representation may alleviate the computational burden of plan-
ning, consider a metropolitan rail (subway) network, in which
stations (i.e., states, e.g., King’s Cross and Oxford Circus) are
organized into lines (i.e., contexts, e.g., the Victoria Line; see Fig-
ure 1A). Unlike planning in a ‘‘flat’’ (non-hierarchical) environ-
ment, plans formed in a hierarchical environment need not
specify each and every state linking the current position and
goal. Rather, it is sufficient to identify the current context and
the (termination) conditions that allow the next context to be
reached; for example, when planning a journey from Marble
Arch to King’s Cross on the London Underground, one should
‘‘take the Central Line to Oxford Circus, and from there, switch
to the Victoria Line’’. Humans seem to represent locations hier-
archically in spatial memory: for example, we have a bias to
judge cities belonging to a common region (e.g., Nevada) as
geographically closer than those crossing a region boundary
(Newcombe and Liben, 1982; Stevens and Coupe, 1978).
Regionalization may also influence navigational strategy: during
wayfinding, humans prefer routes that permit a context bound-
ary to be crossed earlier rather than later (Wiener and Mallot,
2003). In machine learning, states that offer privileged access
to a new context (such as Oxford Circus allowing access to the
Victoria Line) are considered ‘‘bottlenecks,’’ and hierarchical, May 18, 2016 ª 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. 893
er the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Figure 1. Task and Design
(A) Schematic representation of planning under a
flat (left) and hierarchical (right) policy. Each node
from left (start state, shown by the robot) to right
shows a possible state (i.e., station) that could be
visited. The flag indicates the destination station. A
hierarchical policy allows the agent to ‘‘chunk’’ the
maze into contexts (here, a red line and a blue line).
This in turn reduces the cost of planning and plan
representation.
(B) The subway map that participants navigated.
Themapwas rotated and the line colors and station
names were shuffled between participants. Par-
ticipants only saw the map during training.
(C) A schematic depiction of the sequence of
events (trials) that occurred on an example journey.
The names at the top and bottom of the screen refer
to the current and destination stations, respec-
tively. The responses (arrows) and lines (colored
dots) were not shown to participants. Timings (in
seconds) for the various events are shown below.
(D) Examples of how the various distances were
calculated for an example map: DS (stations to
goal), DL (lines to goal), DX (exchange stations to
goal), and DU (U-turn cost). The numbers and blue-
red colormap show the distance in eachmetric that
was used to estimate the cost of planning. The
robot shows the start point, and the flag shows the
destination station.learning models successfully predict that visiting these should
elicit unique patterns of behavior and neural activity (Holroyd
and Yeung, 2012; Ribas-Fernandes et al., 2011; Solway et al.,
2014).
Here, thus, we taught participants to navigate a novel subway
network in which stations (states; e.g., Mandela and Budapest)
were organized hierarchically into lines (contexts) defined by
their color (Figure 1B). Following training, participants were
asked to complete journeys within the network without viewing
the map, pressing keys to move from one station to another.
We analyzed behavior and fMRI data in order to determine894 Neuron 90, 893–903, May 18, 2016whether humans represented plans in a hi-
erarchical fashion (over lines or contexts)
or a flat fashion (over stations or states).
On the neural level, an extensive literature
has implicated both the medial and lateral
PFC in planning on multistep decision
tasks such as the Tower of London (Unter-
rainer and Owen, 2006), but the relative
contribution of these different regions re-
mains unclear. Some studies have found
that the BOLD signal in dorsolateral PFC
scales with the number of moves required
to attain goal state (van den Heuvel et al.,
2003; Wagner et al., 2006), but neural
structures encoding hierarchical plan
complexity have yet to be identified. One
theoretical perspective has suggested
that the dorsomedial PFC (dmPFC) may
play a particular role in representingcontextual information for future behavior (Holroyd and Yeung,
2012). During passive observation of trajectories through a struc-
tured environment, the dmPFC is less active at bottleneck states
(Schapiro et al., 2013), but by contrast, a more caudal medial
prefrontal region shows a positive ‘‘pseudo-reward’’ signal
when a subgoal is attained (Ribas-Fernandes et al., 2011). It
thus remains unclear how the medial and lateral PFC might
contribute to hierarchical planning.
To preview our findings, we identified two frontal cortical re-
gions that encoded the cost of representing a hierarchical
plan: a bilateral anterior premotor region and the dmPFC. These
regions also became differentially active at bottleneck states
(‘‘exchange’’ stations, where participants could switch from
one context to another). Using multivariate analyses, we found
that the dmPFC additionally encoded or monitored the current
context (i.e., the subway line that was currently being taken), a
key quantity that is required for executing a hierarchical plan.
By contrast, the rostromedial PFC and hippocampus encoded
the proximity to a goal state. Together, these findings suggest
that during planning, humans encode the subway network and
formulate plans in a hierarchical fashion.
RESULTS
Task Summary
The task is depicted in Figure 1C. Each journey began at a
pseudo-randomly chosen station (see Experimental Proce-
dures). On each trial, the names of the destination and current
stations were shown, and participants pressed one of four but-
tons (north, south, east, or west) to move to an adjacent sta-
tion, which was then shown on the next trial. Their goal was
to navigate through the subway map from the start station to
the destination station (these successive trials comprising a
‘‘journey’’). During an initial training session, lines were associ-
ated with colors (red, green, yellow, and blue), but at scanning,
all color information was removed. Successful journeys were
rewarded with financial incentives, but there was a small, but
constant, probability that journeys were ‘‘cancelled’’ on each
trial and the reward was unavailable, motivating participants
to make journeys in the shortest possible number of trials. Par-
ticipants carried out 88.8 ± 2 journeys in total, each consisting
of an average of 5.5 ± 0.06 trials. Of these, 78.3% were per-
formed ‘‘optimally’’ (i.e., when all responses decreased the dis-
tance to goal in number of stations). Of the remainder, 15.2%
contained at least one action that led participants further
away from the goal; these responses were made more slowly
(t19 = 7.56, p < 0.000001). Additionally, 9.0% of journeys
included at least one missing response (when subjects failed
to respond on time and remained in the same station as in
the previous trial).
Behavior: The Cost of Plan Representation
The complexity (or description length) of representing a flat (non-
hierarchical) plan is proportional to the number of remaining
states (here, stations) that must be traversed to reach the goal
(here, destination station). By contrast, in a hierarchical plan,
this cost scales with the remaining number of contexts that
must be traversed for the goal to be attained. We thus began
by definingmeasures of plan complexity thatmight be computed
by participants under flat and hierarchical policies. First, we
calculated, on each trial, the number of steps (stations) that re-
mained to be traversed before the goal was reached, assuming
a shortest path trajectory (DS). This represents plan complexity
under a flat policy (see Figure 1D, leftmost). Next, we calculated
the number of contexts that remained to be traversed before the
goal was reached. Thus, if on the current trial there were only one
change of context that would be required to reach the goal, this
valuewould be 1; beyond that context switch, the valuewould be
0. This quantity DL indexes the cost of a hierarchical policy (Fig-ure 1D, center left). Then, as a control, we computed the distance
to goal in number of exchange stations to be traversed. By
design, on many journeys, the shortest path involved passing
through an exchange station without switching context (Fig-
ure 1D, center right). This measure, which we call DX, was thus
decorrelated from DL (for details of the correlation among dis-
tance measures, see Table S3). Finally, we computed another
cost, which represented the number of steps that had to be
taken away from the goal (in cityblock space) in order to reach
it by the shortest path. Thus, this measure, which we call the
U-turn cost (or DU), was high for paths that required ‘‘doubling
back’’ (Figure 1D, rightmost).
We then used linear regression to ask whether (log) response
times (RTs) during navigation were sensitive to the complexity of
the plan as indexed byDS,DL,DX, andDU. Critically, this analysis
yielded significant positive coefficients for number of lines to
goal (DL: t19 = 3.46, p = 0.003) and for the U-turn cost (DU:
t19 = 4.26, p < 0.001; see Figure 2A). When these predictors
competed for variance within a single regression, however, the
number of stations to goal failed to predict RTs (DS: t19 = 1.26,
p = 0.223), as did the number of exchange stations (DX: t19 =
0.49, p = 0.628). This finding suggests that the main costs of
representing the plan were contextual or structural aspects of
the subway map, rather than the number of unique steps
required to reach the destination station. This supports the
view that plans are formed and executed in a hierarchical
fashion.
We defined stations as ‘‘regular’’ (i.e., within a single line; e.g.,
Madrid in Figure 1B) and exchange (i.e., bottlenecks, occurring
at the intersection between lines, e.g., Clinton). Moreover, re-
sponses were classified as either stay (i.e., travel in the same di-
rection as the previous step) or switch (i.e., change the direction
of travel). These factors were orthogonal in our paradigm,
because regular stations sometimes required a direction switch,
as when a single line turned a corner (e.g., Kathmandu in Fig-
ure 1B), but participants could also pass through exchange sta-
tions without switching response (e.g., when passing through
Moscow en route from Winfrey to Bern). This feature of our
design thus allowed us to further include, in the above regres-
sion, separate binary predictors encoding station type (ex-
change versus regular) and response type (switch versus stay).
We observed a main effect of station type (exchange > regular;
t19 = 3.40, p = 0.003) and of direction (switch > stay; t19 = 7.92,
p < 0.001). The interaction between station type and response
type was not significant (t19 = 1.05, p = 0.309). Mean RTs in
each condition are plotted in Figure S1.
Neural Cost of Plan Representation
Next, we sought to identify in the brain imaging data the neural
costs of representing flat or hierarchical plans. In this analysis
and all that follow, all reported results survive correction for
multiple comparisons using a false discovery rate (FDR) with
an alpha of p < 0.05, unless otherwise noted. We built a design
matrix (GLM1) with regressors encoding the various indices
of distance to goal introduced above (DS, DL, DX, and DU; Fig-
ure 2C). Examples of how these distances were computed
are shown in Figure 1D. Regressing this design matrix against
BOLD data, we found that a dmPFC (BA8/32) respondedNeuron 90, 893–903, May 18, 2016 895
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Figure 2. Behavioral andNeural Costs of Flat
and Hierarchical Planning
(A) Regression coefficients (mean ± SEM across
participants) showing the slope of the pre-
dictive relationship between experimental variables
(including distance estimates) and log RTs.
(B) Parametric responses (mean ± SEM) to DS and
DL in the PMC and rlPFC. There is a significant
condition 3 region interaction. The rlPFC ROI is
shown on the right.
(C) Encoding of the four plan complexity measures
(GLM1) in the lateral (coronal view; upper) and
medial (sagittal view; lower) frontal cortices,
rendered onto a template brain, thresholded at
p < 0.001 uncorrected.
(D) Correlation with proximity to goal (GLM1) in the
vmPFC.
(E) Correlation with proximity to goal (GLM2) in the
hippocampus. The activations are shown that
exceed p < 0.001, uncorrected.
(F) Correlation between parameter estimates link-
ing log(RT) to plan complexity in units of station
(left) and lines (right), with beta values encoding
the corresponding distance measure in the PMC
(upper) and dmPFC (lower). The dots correspond
to individual subjects. The lines are to best linear
fits for significant (red) and non-significant (gray)
correlations, respectively.
The significant regions within a circle survived
multiple comparisons correction.positively to the cost of plan representation in units of both lines
(peak:6, 8, 58; t19 = 5.21, p < 0.0001) and the U-turn cost (peak:
2, 12, 46; t19 = 5.63, p < 0.00001). Critically, in GLM1 (when all
four regressors competed to explain variance in BOLD activity)
no dmPFC voxels were sensitive to the distance to goal in terms
of number of stations.
In the lateral PFC, we observed a similar pattern of BOLD sig-
nals in an anterior premotor region (premotor cortex) that strad-
dled BA6 and BA8, where BOLD activity scaled with DL (left
peak: 26, 8, 54; t19 = 6.58, p < 0.000001 and right peak: 30,
4, 66; t19 = 4.99, p < 0.0001) and DU (left peak: 26, 4, 54;
t19 = 6.51, p < 0.000001 and right peak: 26, 8, 46; t19 = 6.30,
p < 0.000001). Here, we also observed an effect of distance in
number of stations, DS (left peak: 22, 8, 50; t19 = 6.62, p <
0.000001 and right peak: 30, 4, 58; t19 = 6.39, p < 0.000001).
Notably, the number of exchange stations between the current
position and the goal (DX) failed to show any consistent effect
at the group level. In other words, these regions encoded the
cost of representing a plan in units that reflected the structure
of the subwaymap, over and above any encoding of the distance
to goal.896 Neuron 90, 893–903, May 18, 2016Previous neuroimaging studies have
noted that BOLD signals in the rostrolat-
eral PFC (rlPFC) scale with the number of
moves that are required to solve the Tower
of London task (van den Heuvel et al.,
2003; Wagner et al., 2006), equivalent to
our DSmeasure. To permit direct compar-
ison with past studies, we created a new
GLM (GLM2) that included only DS (alongside other nuisance
quantities; see Experimental Procedures), omitting the distance
regressors in units of lines, exchange stations, or the U-turn cost.
Consistent with previous work, this analysis identified not only
the premotor cortex (PMC), but also a portion of bilateral rlPFC
(left: 42, 32, 34; t19 = 7.87, p < 0.000001 and right: 42, 40, 34;
t19 = 4.81, p < 0.0001; see Figure 2C). Plotting the average
beta parameters across the cohort for DS and DL confirmed
that the PMC, but not the rlPFC, encoded the cost of a hierarchi-
cal plan, as demonstrated by a region (PMC and rlPFC) 3 dis-
tance (DS and DL) interaction (F1,19 = 4.71, p < 0.05; see
Figure 2B).
Proximity to Goal
Consistent with previous findings (Howard et al., 2014), using
GLM1, we also observed a signal that reflected a negative corre-
lation with distance in stations to goal (DS) in the ventromedial
PFC (vmPFC, peak: 10, 48, 6; t19 = 5.80, p < 0.00001; in other
words, this region became more active the closer to the goal). In
this region, distance was encoded in units of stations only, with
no evidence for encoding of hierarchical distance (Figure 2D).
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Figure 3. BOLD Responses to Bottleneck
States
(A) BOLD signal b values (mean ± SEM) from
single-trial GLM approach in the PMC on
three regular stations preceding (leftmost
points) and following (rightmost points) a con-
text switch (green lines), an exchange station
without line change (purple lines), or an elbow
station (cyan lines). The activation at the
context switch, exchange station, or elbow are
shown with a single point in the corresponding
color. The averaged BOLD signal b in regular
stations is represented by the horizontal
dashed line.
(B) Voxels responding to the main effect of station
type (exchange > regular) in the PMC (left) and
dmPFC (right).
(C) Voxels in the amygdala responding to the interaction between station type and response.
(D) Voxels in the parietal cortex responding to the main effect of response switch. The coordinates in MNI space are provided under each slice. The significant
regions within a circle survived multiple comparisons correction.Including only DS (GLM2) identified a number of other regions,
including the hippocampus, where BOLD signals have previ-
ously been found to scale with distance to goal during navigation
(Howard et al., 2014). In our task, the hippocampus reflected dis-
tance to goal bilaterally in the same direction as the vmPFC (Fig-
ure 2E). A full range of regions that correlated with each of these
distance estimates is reported in Tables S1 and S2.
Correlation of Neural and Behavioral Costs across the
Cohort
Next, we aimed to understand the relationship between the neural
and behavioral effects so far observed (see Figure 2F). For each
measure of planning cost (DS, DL, DX, and DU), we calculated the
correlation across the cohort of participants between its influence
on RT (regression coefficient from Figure 2A) and its influence on
BOLDsignals in (1) thePMCand (2) the dmPFC.We found the cor-
relation was significant in dmPFC for both distance in number of
stations (DS: R = 0.6, p < 0.005) and in number of line changes
(DL: R = 0.39, p < 0.05). However, neither of these correlations
was significant in the PMC (DS: R = 0.05, p = 0.57 and DL: R =
0.07, p = 0.379). No brain-behavior correlations were observed
ineither region forDXorDU. However,wedidobserve acorrelation
between the behavioral cost of DU and the encoding of DU in a
dlPFC regionshown inFigureS4 (DU:R=0.33,p<0.05one-tailed).
Neural Signals Associated with Bottleneck States
The analyses described above suggest that both dmPFC and
PMC encoded the hierarchical cost of representing a plan,
over and above any cost of plan representation computed in
units of discrete states. Next, we investigated neural signals in
these regions more closely, by plotting the activity that accom-
panied the moment in which a bottleneck state occurred, when
participants were offered the opportunity to switch from one
context to another. We once again capitalized on the factorial
design of our task, asking if there were unique neural signals
that varied with station type (exchange > regular, now including
all trials; Figure 3B). This analysis also included a regressor en-
coding DS, as well as a further nuisance predictor that signaled
whether the action chosen was optimal or not (GLM2).We observed increases in BOLD signals associated with ex-
change stations in both the dmPFC (peak: 6, 16, 46; t19 = 4.09,
p < 0.001) and PMC, overlapping with the region described
above (left peak: 26, 8, 54; t19 = 7.24, p < 0.000001 and right
peak: 26, 12, 54; t19 = 6.56, p < 0.00001). Across the subject
cohort, the strength of this latter neural effect predicted the RT
difference between exchange and regular stations (r = 0.40,
p < 0.04), but not between switch and stay trials (p = 0.70). A
further effect of exchange > regular stations was observed in a
more anterior prefrontal region, in bilateral BA 46 (left peak:
42, 24, 30; t19 = 4.48, p < 0.0001 and right peak: 46, 32, 22;
t19 = 5.38, p < 0.0001).
Next, we plotted how the BOLD signal varied on those regular
stations that both preceded and followed an exchange or an
elbow station. A brain region encoding the hierarchical represen-
tation of a planmight be expected to show tonically higher BOLD
signals in the trials preceding an exchange station (where the
cost of plan representation in units of lines remains high), fol-
lowed by a reduction immediately after context switch (where
the computational burden is reduced). In Figure 3A, we plot the
BOLD signal in the PMC region (extracted from the main effect
of type of station) on regular stations that precede and succeed
a context switch (green lines). An elevated BOLD signal is visible
on those trials preceding a context switch, after which it drops off
sharply (comparison between preceding and succeeding: t19 =
3.24, p < 0.003). Of note, a similar drop is not observed when
the same analysis is conducted on stations that precede or
succeed an exchange station without a context switch (purple
lines; p > 0.9) and only a modest drop follows an elbow station
(t19 = 1.87, p < 0.05, one tailed). These effects were qualified
by the interaction of type of station and type of response on
the difference of signal (preceding and following) around each
condition: F1,19 = 5.44, p < 0.04. In other words, the average
BOLD signal in PMC observed was higher on trials before than
after a context switch, consistent with a hierarchical representa-
tion of the plan. We additionally found a main effect of type of
response: F1,19 = 4.61, p < 0.05, indicating that participants
also anticipated making a response switch. Signals from the
dmPFC followed a similar pattern, although the interaction failedNeuron 90, 893–903, May 18, 2016 897
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Figure 4. Encoding of Context inMultivariate
BOLD Signals
(A) A depiction of the predicted representational
dissimilarity matrix that was used to identify brain
regions where the similarity structure was greater
within than between contexts. The blue (and yellow)
squares represent low (high) dissimilarity, respec-
tively for independent pairs of scanner runs and
lines (x and y axis).
(B) The results of the RSA identifying voxels en-
coding context, i.e., where multivoxel pattern
dissimilarity was greater between than within
contexts (lines), identified using a searchlight
approach.
(C) Voxels where the pattern encoding the para-
metric distance to goal (in units of station) wasmore
different between than within contexts (lines).
(D) The results of the control analysis for (B)
involving shuffled stations-line assignments. An
additional control analysis was performed to assert
that the effect was not driven by line orientation (see
Figure S2). The significant regions within a circle
survived multiple comparisons correction.to reach significance. An equivalent analysis for RTs is shown in
the Supplemental Information (Figure S3).
Neural Signals Accompanying Response Switch and
Context Switch
Behavioral data indicated that there was a unique cost incurred
when participants switched context, i.e., at exchange stations
requiring a response switch. In the fMRI data, we observed a
comparable interaction between type of station and response
switch in a cluster of voxels straddling the amygdala and puta-
men (left peak: 26, 0, 10; t19 = 4.46, p < 0.001 and right
peak: 22, 4,14; t19 = 5.20, p < 0.0001), as well as an extrastriate
region on the lingual gyrus (peak: 26, 68, 6; t19 = 5.16, p <
0.0001), corresponding to area V4 where responses to color
are often observed (Zeki and Marini, 1998). Plotting parameter
estimates for these regions showed that this interaction was
driven by higher BOLD signals for those trials where participants
switched from one context to another (Figure 3C). However, we
interpret these results with caution, because they failed to reach
the threshold required for correction using an FDR threshold.
Finally, we also observed strong activations in the parietal cortex
that predicted whether participants switched direction or not (left
peak: 38, 32, 46; t19 = 10.8, p < 0.000000001 and right peak:
54, 24, 34; t19 = 8.39, p < 0.0000001; Figure 3D).
Encoding of Current Context
To execute a hierarchical plan, an agent must be able to identify
and represent the current context, in addition to the current
state (i.e., on the London Underground, to know that one is on
the Victoria Line, not just that one is at Green Park station).
We thus used a multivariate analysis technique known as repre-
sentational similarity analysis (RSA) to identify brain regions in
which the patterns of BOLD signal over voxels was more similar
across runs within a single subway line than between two898 Neuron 90, 893–903, May 18, 2016different lines (using unsmoothed data; see Experimental Proce-
dures for details; Figure 4A). In the scanner, no indication
was given as to the subway line currently being visited, and so
any significant voxels must reflect an abstract encoding of
the context from memory. In conjunction with a whole-brain
‘‘searchlight’’ approach, this analysis once again identified the
dmPFC as a region where the current context was represented
(peak 10, 8, 54; t19 = 7.49, p < 0.000001; Figure 4B). No evi-
dence for context encoding in the PMC was found, although
evidence was found in other regions, including more anterior
portions of the PFC in BA9 (left peak: 30, 44, 34; t19 = 5.32,
p < 0.0001 and right peak: 34, 44, 30; t19 = 4.9, p < 0.001).
The analyses above indicated that the dmPFC encodes dis-
tance to goal in units of lines and U-turns. It could be, thus,
that the pattern encoding of this quantitymay depend on the cur-
rent line, providing evidence for a distinct computational cost
within each context. We thus repeated our RSA, but using not
the raw BOLD signal observed at each station, but the para-
metric encoding of distance to goal (in stations). The pattern of
encoding of distance to goal was also more similar within lines
than it was between lines in the dmPFC (2, 20, 54; t19 = 5.38,
p < 0.0001); it is shown in Figure 4C.
RSA can yield spurious results when trials assigned to each
category are not fully temporally decorrelated, and so we con-
ducted this analysis between runs (e.g., measured the similarity
between line a on run1 and line b on run 2). We additionally con-
ducted a control analysis in which the assignments between sta-
tions and lines were shuffled; this yielded no significant results
(Figure 4D).
Finally, subway lines contained long straight sections, and so
we were concerned that RSA of context might have captured
similarity associated with travel in a common direction, unrelated
to context per se. To test this, we conducted another RSA using
the same approach, but searched for regions where multivoxel
patterns weremore similar within than between directions (north,
south, east, and west). No activations were observed in the
medial PFC, but a large cluster of significant voxels was found
in the left motor cortex (Figure S2).
DISCUSSION
The behavior of humans and other animals is controlled at
least in part by a ‘‘model-based’’ control system that learns
the structure of the world and organizes sequential behavior
in pursuit of future goals (Daw et al., 2005; Dickinson and Bal-
leine, 2002; Dolan and Dayan, 2013; Schoenbaum et al.,
2009; Tolman, 1948). Recent work has begun to address
the neural and computational substrates underlying the
model-based decision-making by constructing ‘‘two-step’’
decision tasks in which cached state-action values and
explicit forward search strategies make opposing predictions
about behavior and brain activity (Daw et al., 2011; Gla¨scher
et al., 2010; Wunderlich et al., 2012). However, these studies
sidestep one key theoretical challenge associated with model-
based approaches, namely, how to organize behavior over
multiple future states without incurring a prohibitive computa-
tional cost. Human cognition has evolved to meet this chal-
lenge, as exemplified by our ability to form and follow plans
over multiple timescales, for example when finding an efficient
route to run a series of errands, or envisaging a future career
path and taking steps toward its fulfillment. Although we have
known for decades that planning involves the PFC, to date,
very little has been revealed about the computational mecha-
nisms that unfold in these regions during plan formation and
execution.
Here, we drew upon a framework that has its roots in cognitive
psychology (Miller et al., 1960; Norman and Shallice, 1986), but
has most recently inspired advances in machine intelligence
(Botvinick et al., 2009; Ponsen et al., 2010). This framework pro-
poses that the space of possible states can be organized and
represented hierarchically as a series of clusters or contexts,
reducing plan complexity (description length), and affording sub-
stantive increases in computational efficiency both at the time of
plan formation and plan execution. In the current study, we
tested a prediction arising from this hypothesis: that when plan-
ning in a complex environment, the cost of representing a plan
will be expressed in units of context (or context switch) over
and above any cost that is incurred in units of states themselves.
Our key finding is that both RTs and neural activity in the caudal
frontal cortex encode the cost of representing a hierarchical
plan, indicating that they participate in the hierarchical organiza-
tion of future behavior.
The neural costs observed were identified in two frontal re-
gions: a dmPFC region, falling in the presupplementary motor
cortex, that is often found to be sensitive to the difficulty (or con-
flict) incurredwhenmaking a choice (Botvinick et al., 1999), and a
lateral frontal that straddles the border between the premotor
and prefrontal cortices, in BA6/BA8. Both regions were also
active when participants were faced with the opportunity to
switch context, at an exchange station or bottleneck, consistent
with the finding that the dmPFC responds to subgoal attainment
(Ribas-Fernandes et al., 2011). However, across the participantcohort, we observed reliable brain-behavior correlations in only
the dmPFC, but not the PMC. In the dmPFC, the strength with
which BOLD signals encoded distance to goal in units both of
stations and contexts for a given subject predicted his or her cor-
responding RT cost for those plan complexity measures. We
also found that the multivariate pattern of information in the
dmPFC (but not PMC) was sufficient to distinguish among con-
texts, even though the line that was currently visited was never
explicitly displayed to participants during the scanning phase.
Moreover, we were also able to distinguish context-specific rep-
resentations of distance to goal in the dmPFC, as if the region en-
coded separate costs of planning for each individual context.
One interpretation of this finding is that the dmPFC is responsible
for the translating of a plan into behavior, whereas the PMC par-
ticipates in maintaining the active plan over the journey. How-
ever, we note that those participants showing the strongest flat
cost in behavior also showed stronger encoding of this cost
in dmPFC neural signals. It may be, thus, that there are some
individual differences in the way that dmPFC contributes to
computing the cost of planning.
More generally, our findings are consistent with the view that
the dmPFC encodes a motivational signal that is extended
over time (Summerfield and Koechlin, 2009) and the comple-
mentary perspective that the dmPFC encodes ‘‘option’’ values
under the framework of hierarchical reinforcement learning (Hol-
royd and Yeung, 2012). As part of a general role in monitoring the
expected value of controlled behavior (Shenhav et al., 2013), the
dmPFCmay thus encode both the identity and value of a contex-
tual variable over which a particular policy applies, for example,
when foraging from different patches (Hayden et al., 2011; Kol-
ling et al., 2012).
The lateral region overlaps with the superior aspect of the
caudal dorsolateral PFC identified by Koechlin et al. (2003) as
active when actions are selected on the basis of contextual infor-
mation. The same region is labeled ‘‘pre-PMd’’ by Badre et al.
(2010), who found that this region is active when action selection
is contingent on a hierarchy of contingencies, rather than a flat
series of sensorimotor associations. In this region (as in behavior
and the dmPFC signal), the BOLD signal scaled with distance to
the destination station in units of context (i.e., lines), but not the
metric provided by individual states (i.e., stations). Notably, no
such effect was observed in more rostral regions that have pre-
viously been implicated in representing plan complexity in multi-
step problems such as the Tower of London task (van den Heu-
vel et al., 2003; Wagner et al., 2006). At first glance this finding is
surprising, one might have expected more anterior regions to be
responsible for representing the higher hierarchical aspects of a
complex plan. However, one explanation for this finding is that
during hierarchical planning, potentially complex action se-
quences are ‘‘compressed’’ to a small number of steps (e.g.,
contexts and context switches) that can then be represented in
subsidiary prefrontal regions located more caudally (Koechlin
and Summerfield, 2007).
Interestingly, the cost of representing a plan was incurred in
units of context, but not in units of response switch. This explains
the previous finding that humans seek to reach a new context
earlier rather than later during navigation, as doing so reduces
the computational burden of plan representations (Wiener andNeuron 90, 893–903, May 18, 2016 899
Mallot, 2003). This result additionally suggests that the hierarchi-
cal representation of the plan is encoded in terms of its abstract
structure, rather than as a succession of macro-actions (e.g.,
‘‘go straight, then go left’’). Nor was the plan encoded in terms
of the number of choice points, suggesting that the state space
is not chunked purely on the basis of its physical properties (e.g.,
in terms of segments between choice points), but in a fashion
that reflected the more abstract structure that they were encour-
aged to learn during training. What remains unclear, however, is
whether context is represented as a cluster of interlinked
perceptual states (i.e., stations on the yellow line), or as a series
of macro-policies that dictate pursuit of a goal (e.g., keep going
straight on until you reach a given switch point). A hint that
participants relied on perceptual representation of context was
provided by the finding that voxels in area V4 became active at
context switches, as if participants were recalling the color of
the new subway line (which was not shown to them during
scanning). However, the precise nature of the information that
characterizes a context remains an open question. For example,
participants might have used information about the spatial orga-
nization of the map (the blue line runs from north to south or the
red line is north of the green line).
Moreover, both behavior and the PMC also encoded an addi-
tional ‘‘U-turn’’ cost, that indexed the extent to which plans
involved doubling back toward the current location along a
different line. In the planning literature, it has been noted
that goal-subgoal conflict—for example, the need to temporarily
remove one disc from a peg and subsequently replace it in
the Tower of London task—incurs a unique RT cost (Ward and
Allport, 1997) and poses a particular problem for patients
with lateral prefrontal lesions (Morris et al., 1997). Consistent
with this finding, U-turn costs were visible not only in the PMC,
but also in lateral prefrontal regions. The existence of a unique
U-turn cost in our navigation task demonstrates that participants
not only encoded plans in the subway network as a hierarchical
series of contexts, but also in terms of the geometry of the map
that they saw in the training session.
Although the costs of representing a flat plan were minimal
once variance associated with a hierarchical plan had been par-
tialled out, there was one brain region where strong (positive)
covariation with number of stations to goal was observed, the
vmPFC. Previous theories have speculated that the vmPFC
may be among a set of regions that tracks distance to a goal
state (Holroyd and Yeung, 2012) and, indeed, the vmPFC is
implicated in episodic future thinking (Schacter and Addis,
2007), and has been found to track growing expected reward
in decision tasks involving sequential, interdependent choices
(Tsetsos et al., 2014). The hippocampus has also previously
been found to covary with proximity to goal, but only in virtual re-
ality environments that mimic much more closely the naturalistic
experience of navigation (Howard et al., 2014; Viard et al., 2011).
Here, we show that the distance to goal representation is present
evenwhen current and goal state information is devoid of the rich
episodic cues that we normally use to navigate. Critically, how-
ever, the hippocampus and vmPFC showed no evidence of a hi-
erarchical signal.
Our analyses focused on the cost of ‘‘representing’’ a hierar-
chical (or flat plan) as participants navigated through the900 Neuron 90, 893–903, May 18, 2016network. This is a general index of the cost involved in maintain-
ing and monitoring the plan, rather than of recursively searching
through all possible nodes of the decision tree (for example, via a
breadth- or depth-first algorithm) or ‘‘pruning’’ of unpromising
routes to a goal (Huys et al., 2012, 2015). While plan formation
may have occurred mainly on presentation of the cue screen
stating the start and goal stations, plans may also have been
constantly updated and reformed during execution (‘‘replan-
ning’’). Indeed, as distance to goal grows, the processing cost
of these search operations will grow correspondingly. However,
it is not clear that this cost would grow linearly with the number of
states or contexts that must be traversed to reach a goal. One
limitation of the approach taken here is that we do not have an
obviousmeans to assess how plans are formed prior to or during
navigation or to distinguish the neural mechanisms that accom-
pany plan maintenance and monitoring from any replanning that
may be occurring. We did examine BOLD signals evoked in
response to the cue screen, but they did not show convincing
correlations with the various distance metrics or predict the
journeys that participants would follow. However, it is unclear
whether this null finding is due to a lack of statistical power,
owing to the limited number of such trials. Examining the costs
incurred at the time of plan formation would be an interesting
avenue of research for future studies.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Subjects
A total of 22 healthy participants (10 female and 12male; age 19–34,mean 25.6
years; one was the first author of the study) were recruited into the study in
accordance with local ethical guidelines. No participants reported a history
of psychiatric or neurological illness, and all had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. Participants were paid £35 for participation in both a practice
and a scanner session on two separate days. A monetary incentive of up to
£10, proportional to performance, was added to the previous amount. There
were two participants that were excluded due to poor performance on the
task (more than 20% of the journeys included a move in the wrong direction
during the main experiment).
Stimuli and Task Design
The same subway map was used for all participants, but the names of the sta-
tions and the colors of the lines were randomly shuffled, and the map was
randomly rotated by 0, 90, 180, or 270 (example shown in Figure 1B).
Following training (see below), participants performed the main task, which
involved navigating in a virtual subway environment, in the MRI scanner. Each
journey involved a start station and a destination station that were randomly
selected with the constraint that the journey would require at least one change
of line (17.8% of journeys) or one change of direction without changing lines
(10.7%) or both (71.5%). Participants navigated through the subway map by
pressing buttons (see below). On each trial, there was a constant probability
that the journey was cancelled, engineered such that cancellation probability
was independent of the length of the optimal journey and led to approximately
50% of journeys being cancelled; cancellation probability was independent of
the hierarchical aspects of the task. Overall, 52.9% of journeys were success-
fully completed. Each journey was rewarded with a monetary value (either one
or five virtual coins, signaled during navigation), whichwere converted to real in-
centives (normalized to a maximum of £10) that were paid out as a bonus at the
end of the experiment. Behavioral performance did not differ as a function of the
incentives offered, so we collapsed over this factor for all analyses.
Procedure
The main task is depicted in Figure 1C. Each journey began with the presenta-
tion of a cue screen for 3 s that indicated the starting point and the destination
(stations and lines). After a period of 2–5 s (jittered) of blank screen, on each of
the successive trials a navigation screen was displayed for 3 s. This screen
provided multiple pieces of information: the names of the current and destina-
tion stations; the line color of the destination station; the reward at stake for the
current journey; the cumulative reward so far; and the cardinal directions
(north, south, east, and west) available from the current station. Critically, no
information about the current line or about the line associated with each action
was shown. At each step, participants had to choose the direction theywanted
to take by pressing one out of four buttons. If no key was pressed, the same
station was shown again in the next step. Each navigation screen was followed
by a blank screen of 1–3 s (jittered); no feedback was provided during
navigation.
The journey ended either when the participant reached the destination or
when the journey was cancelled. After the journey was finished or cancelled,
a feedback screen informed whether the destination had been reached or
not and the reward that had been obtained. This screen was displayed for
2 s and was followed by a blank screen of 2–5 s (jittered) before the next
cue screen occurred. Participants completed as many journeys as possible
in four successive runs buttressed by lead-in and lead-out durations of 10 s
and 5 s, respectively. The total scanning time, including anatomical and local-
izer scans, was around 75 min per participant.
Training Task
All participants were trained in a separate behavioral session that took place
outside the scanner exactly 2 days before the main experimental task. This
training session was similar to the main task, with the following exceptions.
First, the map (e.g., Figure 1B) was shown for 10 s prior to the start of each
journey. Second, participants were allowed unlimited time to respond, moving
on to the next screen only after a key press had been initiated. Third, the avail-
able actions were shown in the color of the corresponding line, and a picture
matching the name of each station was displayed consistently in the back-
ground to facilitate the learning of the map. An additional key press (space
bar)was required to switch between lines and, during a line switch, an animated
clock was shown on screen and a delay of 1 s was imposed. On each journey,
the starting and destination stations were selected uniformly, permitting a
larger number of possible journeys and, at the end of each journey, a feedback
screen informed the participant of (1) the total length of the journey and (2) the
minimum length that couldhavebeenbeachieved (i.ewhether their journeyhad
been optimal or not). During training, journeys were never cancelled and no
monetary outcomes were associated with successful journeys. Lastly, we
introduced ten ‘‘quizzes’’ at homogeneous times during the training session
(always between journeys), each including ten ‘‘questions’’ where the current
station and the goal were cued, but participants were only required to respond
to the first step toward the goal. Participants were informed of the scores
obtained at the end of each quiz and were instructed to learn during the whole
session as to maximize their scores during the quiz. They completed as many
journeys as possible over a period of 45 min.
On the day of scanning, before entering the MRI, participants performed a
practice block identical to one of the main task scanner runs. They were al-
lowed to see themap one last time before the beginning of this second training
session. Data from this session were not included in the analyses.
fMRI Acquisition
Magnetic resonance images were acquired with a 3T Siemens VERIO scanner
with a 32-channel head coil using a standard echo-planar imaging sequence.
Whole-head T2*-weighted echo-planar images were continuously acquired
with a repetition time of 2 s, echo time of 30 ms. We acquired fMRI data in
four runs (17 min each) of between 456 and 510 volumes, plus three dummy
scans discarded before the analyses. For technical reasons, three participants
completed only three runs. Each volume included 64 3 643 36 voxels of 3 3
3 3 3 mm. A high-resolution T1-weighted structural image was also obtained
(voxel size = 13 13 1 mm). For standard preprocessing and univariate statis-
tical analyses, we usedSPM12 (WellcomeDepartment of Cognitive Neurology,
London, United Kingdom). All other analyses were carried out with custom
scripts for Matlab (Mathworks). We also used XjView (http://www.alivelearn.
net/xjview) to visualize the data and to construct mask images and impose
an FDR correction for multiple comparisons (Genovese et al., 2002). For eachparticipant, we first realigned all functional images, thenwe co-registered (rigid
body transformation) the anatomical scan to the mean functional image. We
then segmented each subject’s co-registered anatomical scan, using
segmented probabilistic maps for gray matter, white matter, cerebro-spinal
fluid, bone, soft tissue, and air/background in the Montreal Neurological Insti-
tute (MNI) space. The parameters obtained were applied to normalize the sub-
ject’s functional scans to the template brain MNI space. Functional images
were resampled (33333mmvoxels) and spatially smoothed (6-mm full-width
half-maximum [FWHM] Gaussian kernel). For all analyses, a 128 s temporal
high-pass filter was applied to remove low-frequency scanner artifacts. Tem-
poral autocorrelation in the time series data was estimated using restricted
maximum-likelihood estimates of variance components using a first-order au-
toregressive model (AR-1), and the resulting non-sphericity was used to form
maximum-likelihood estimates of the activations, consistent with standard ap-
proaches in SPM (Penny et al., 2006).
Behavioral Analyses
We analyzed log reaction times with linear regression as described in the main
text and the significant contribution of each regressor was validated through a
t test using an alpha of p < 0.05. All regressors and interactions were Z scored
before being introduced in the regression. The optimal path was obtained
through a generalized version of the Dijkstra algorithm that minimized multiple
distances, by priority: in number of stations, number of response switches, and
number of exchange stations. The U-turn cost was defined as the signed dif-
ference between the distance in number of stations and the Manhattan (city-
block) distance: DU(a,b) = DS(a,b)  jxa  xbj  jya  ybj, where (xi,yi) are the
geometrical coordinates of a station i, j$j is the absolute value operator, and
DS is the distance in number of stations. An illustration of how the various
indices of distance to goal were computed is shown in Figure 1D. The original
Dijkstra algorithm was based on in-house code.
Univariate Analyses of Functional Data
All univariate analyses were based on a generalized linear model (GLM)
approach. Our GLM included regressors coding for onsets and durations of
stimuli or events, which were then convolved with the canonical haemody-
namic response function (HRF) and regressed against the observed fMRI
data. Scanner runs were concatenated for univariate analyses, and constant
terms for each run were included manually. Additionally, motion parameters
and the average signal outside of the brain were included as nuisance vari-
ables for all GLMs. Group-level statistics were estimated from the individual
b patterns, not the within-subject statistics.
The main analyses described in the paper were based on two GLMs. Unless
otherwise specified, we only considered journeys where the participant always
moved toward the goal (‘‘optimal’’ journeys), but other journeys were modeled
separately. GLM1 included the following conditions convolved with the canon-
ical HRF basis function: main effect of cue screen; main effect of feedback
screen; and main effect of navigation screen for suboptimal journeys. We
modeled navigation screens during optimal journeys independently for (1)
line changes, (2) exchange stations without a line change, (3) elbow stations,
and (4) regular stations without response switch. Additionally, we included
the following parametric modulators for regular stations without response
switch: distance to goal in number of stations (DS); distance to goal in number
of line changes (DL); distance to goal in number of exchange stations (DX); and
theU-turn cost (DU). GLM2 included the following conditions:main effect of cue
screen; main effect of feedback screen; and main effect of navigation screen.
Additionally, the navigation screen included the following parametric modula-
tors: typeof station (exchange > regular); type of response (switch> stay); inter-
action between station and response; distance to goal in number of stations
(DS); and performance on the current step (1 if optimal and 1 otherwise).
All effects reported survived FDR correction for multiple comparisons, un-
less noted in the main text. Images and tables are thresholded at p < 0.001,
unless otherwise noted. All the analyses described here focused on effects
during the time of navigation. Peak activations are reportedwith the coordinate
system of the MNI template brain. Regions of interest (ROI) were defined by
manually selecting clusters under a threshold of p < 0.001 uncorrected.
The mask in rlPFC was extracted from a main effect of distance to goal in
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BOLD-RT Correlation Analysis
Weextracted the average beta obtained fromGLM1, andwe obtained average
values for dmPFC and PMC. We also obtained similar beta values of effect of
DS and DL in explaining log-reaction times (see Experimental Procedures,
Behavioral Analyses). We then performed a non-parametric Spearman corre-
lation across participants for each region and type of distance.
Single-Trial GLM Approach
We performed a single-trial analysis in order to extract the average signal in
PMC before and after a line change, an elbow station, an exchange station
without response switch (i.e., a line stay), or a regular station without
response switch. First, we constructed a design matrix in which each trial
was modeled with a unique regressor. From this, we obtained a single sca-
lar BOLD estimate for each voxel on each trial. We then averaged these
values within the PMC region for each station type. To avoid double dip-
ping, our ROI was defined based on orthogonal contrast of type of station
(exchange > regular) from GLM2 (p < 0.001 uncorrected). Second, we aver-
aged the PMC signal for the neighboring trials around each condition (i.e.,
line change, elbow station, line stay, and regular station) within the journey.
Critically, we restricted these neighboring trials only to regular stations
without response switch.
Our prediction was that the BOLD signal in PMC would be higher before a
line change than after, but that this difference would not be reflected around
elbow stations or exchange stations without a line change. We calculated
the difference on the trials immediately before/after each condition and per-
formed a statistical analysis on the main effects of type of station and type
of response on this difference. For better visualization, we controlled for be-
tween-subject variability in Figure 3A, where we displayed the activity in
PMC of all other conditions relative to the average signal in regular stations
without response switch.
Representation Similarity Analysis
For representation similarity analysis (RSA), we constructed a new GLM with
four regressors (per scanner run) that each encoded regular stations (without
a response switch) corresponding to one subway line (context regressors),
and four further parametric regressors that modulated each event by dis-
tance to goal (in number of stations; context distance regressors). We
used unsmoothed images for this analysis. Additional regressors encoded
other quantities (cue screen; feedback screen; in navigation: line changes,
‘‘elbow’’ stations, and exchange stations without a line change; and nuisance
regressors). We used a searchlight approach, in which a sphere of 15 mm
radius was moved progressively over the brain volume, with the resulting
RSA estimates allocated to the centroid voxel for localization and display.
Results obtained with a smaller radius (10 mm) were qualitatively very similar.
For context decoding (Figure 4B), we estimated for each scanner run (n = 4)
the pattern of resulting betas for each of the four context regressors and
computed their correlation distance (1-Pearson correlation) yielding a 16 3
16 neural dissimilarity matrix. This matrix was regressed against the pre-
dicted representation dissimilarity matrix (RDM) shown in Figure 4A within
each searchlight and statistics performed on the resulting betas at the sec-
ond (between-subject) level. In the predicted RDM, distances were greater
between lines than within lines. We excluded comparisons within a single
run, to control temporal autocorrelation in the within-session BOLD signal.
An identical approach was used for the context distance regressors (Fig-
ure 4C). In the control condition (Figure 4D), the assignment of regular and
elbow stations to each line was shuffled, so that the hierarchical structure
was lost. We then repeated the estimation of beta patterns and the search-
light RSA approach as above.
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